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FROM NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TO EVERY STUDENT
SUCCEEDS:
BACK TO A FUTURE FOR EDUCATION FEDERALISM
Michael Heise∗
When passed in 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act represented
the federal government’s most dramatic foray into the elementary and
secondary public school policymaking terrain. While critics emphasized
the Act’s overreliance on standardized testing and its reduced schooldistrict and state autonomy, proponents lauded the Act’s goal to close
the achievement gap between middle- and upper-middle-class students
and students historically ill served by their schools. Whatever structural
changes the No Child Left Behind Act achieved, however, were largely
undone in 2015 by the Every Student Succeeds Act, which repositioned
signiﬁcant federal education policy control in state governments. From
a federalism standpoint, the Every Student Succeeds Act may have reset
education federalism boundaries to favor states, far exceeding their position prior to 2001.
While federal elementary and secondary education reform efforts
since 2001 may intrigue legal scholars, a focus on educational federalism risks obscuring an even more fundamental development in educational policymaking power: its migration from governments to families,
from regulation to markets. Amid a multidecade squabble between federal and state lawmakers over education policy authority, efforts to
harness individual autonomy and market forces in the service of
increasing children’s educational opportunity and equity have grown.
Persistent demands for and increased availability of school voucher programs, charter schools, tax credit programs, and homeschooling demonstrate families’ desire for greater agency over decisions about their
children’s education. Parents’ calls for greater control over critical
decisions concerning their children’s education and schooling options may
eclipse state and federal lawmakers’ legislative squabbles over educational federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
From a formal legal perspective, the initial years of the twenty-ﬁrst
century unmasked the nation’s growing uncertainty about K–12 education federalism. America’s long and deep tradition of local control over
general education policy began to erode as the federal government entered discrete K–12 regulatory spaces, largely incident to President
Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty.1 Despite discrete federal regulatory
pockets targeting speciﬁc challenges to identiﬁable student subpools,
through the end of the twentieth century, few contested the point that,
in general, education policymaking fundamentally remained a state and
1. See, e.g., Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015)
(reauthorizing and amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that
was initially enacted in 1965). For a recent discussion of Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 and its purposes, see James S. Liebman & Michael
Mbikiwa, Every Dollar Counts: In Defense of the Obama Department of Education’s
“Supplement Not Supplant” Proposal, 117 Colum. L. Rev. Online 36, 38–41 (2017),
http://columbialawreview.org/content/every-dollar-counts-in-defense-of-the-obama-departmentof-educations-supplement-not-supplant-proposal/ [http://perma.cc/LAG6-Q7MD].
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local enterprise.2 This allocation of policymaking authority largely tracked
the dominance of state and local financial contributions to school budgets.3
The emergence of the twenty-ﬁrst century, however, coincided with
Congress enacting the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and singularly
upending traditional education federalism boundaries. While different
people may have had different perspectives on NCLB, few contested its
dramatic implications for K–12 education federalism in general and its
signiﬁcant expansion of the federal footprint in particular.4 Simply put,
NCLB profoundly reshaped education federalism boundaries when it
became law in 2001. Notwithstanding its profound implications for
education federalism, however, NCLB did not fundamentally dislodge
the primacy of state and local funding for most school budgets.
Despite not yet having fully digested NCLB and its implications for a
more robust federal inﬂuence in K–12 education, Congress, once again,
dramatically readjusted education federalism lines in 2015. The enactment of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) not only unwound
federal shifts achieved through NCLB but also may have shifted K–12
policymaking authority back to the states and local districts more so than
before NCLB, according to some scholars.5 ESSA’s relative infancy makes
it difficult to assess with accuracy how it will mature and evolve over time.
While ESSA’s efficacy as a matter of policy remains similarly unclear at
this time, what is already quite clear, however, is ESSA’s effect on
education federalism. To complicate education federalism matters further,
at the same time that Congress toggled between NCLB and ESSA and
unsettled vertical separation of power understandings, the executive
branch disrupted long-standing horizontal separation of power balances
with two “Dear Colleague” letters issued by the U.S. Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights.6 Quite aside from—but nonetheless
related to—the dramatic shifts in education federalism boundaries
themselves, a related point involves the increased velocity and rapidity of
such dramatic reassignments of policymaking authority between the

2. See generally Natalie Gomez-Velez, Public School Governance and Democracy:
Does Public Participation Matter?, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 297, 301–08 (2008) (summarizing
increasing federal involvement in public education over the course of the twentieth century).
3. See infra Table 1.
4. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 959, 966 (2015) [hereinafter Robinson, Disrupting] (“NCLB represents the
most expansive education reform law in the history of the United States.”).
5. See generally Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The
Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Black,
Abandoning] (manuscript at 131–33) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
“whatever federal leadership and leverage the NCLB provided, the ESSA largely eliminates
it” and that ESSA “moves the Elementary and Secondary Education Act backward,
transforming more of the existing funds into block grants,” which allow states more
discretion).
6. See infra section I.B.
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federal and state and local governments over education policymaking
authority.
After brieﬂy describing these important shifts in K–12 education
federalism, this Essay takes a step back in an effort to gain some
perspective and helpful context. Greater analytic distance from the
admittedly important federalism changes achieved through relatively
recent—and dramatic—congressional and executive activity ushers into
sharp relief one important yet underappreciated point: While federal
and state governments continue to squabble over federalism turf in the
K–12 domain, a more profound shift in education authority—a shift from
governments (local, state, and federal) to parents—is well underway and
increasing in velocity. While many legal scholars, including constitutional
and education policy scholars, understandably focus on the vertical and
horizontal separation of power dimensions raised by a succession of
federal legislation and administrative activities,7 such a focus risks
obscuring an equally, if not more, important long-term shift in K–12
education policymaking authority.
Evidence of an even more profound transfer of control over critical
education decisionmaking authority from governments to parents and
families abounds. The growing demand for charter schools, school
voucher programs, tax credit programs, and homeschooling—independently and collectively—suggests that families have an almost unquenchable thirst for greater agency when it comes to decisions about their
children’s education.8 To be sure, many scholars note the growth of
school choice in the education context.9 Similarly, education federalism
scholarship also continues to grow.10 What these two distinct literatures
miss, however, is how the former literature implicates the latter.
Speciﬁcally, while federal and state governmental officials persist with an
education federalism “tug-of-war” and Congress and the Department of
Education squabble over policy turf, these governmental units are
7. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 105–06); Kristi L.
Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, 51 Mich. J.L. Reform (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 7) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Michael Heise, The Political
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125, 130–35 (2006) [hereinafter Heise,
Political Economy]; Robinson, Disrupting, supra note 4, at 963; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson,
The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 287, 331 (2013)
[hereinafter Robinson, High Cost].
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public 21 (2001);
Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and Public
Policy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1126 (2001); Michael W. McConnell, Governments,
Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational Choice, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 847, 847 (1999);
James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale L.J.
2043, 2063–64 (2002); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support
“Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 909, 922 (2007).
10. See, e.g., Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 126–27; Robinson, High Cost,
supra note 7, at 287.
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ﬁghting over a shrinking slice of the education policy pie. That is, while
intra-government federalism battles over policymaking authority persist,
parents are increasingly demanding and receiving greater control over at
least one critical education decision: where their kids will attend school.
A reduction in real and perceived access to quality schooling partly fuels
parents’ increased demand for agency over where their kids will attend
school. Moreover, technological advances combine with a growing supply
of high quality educational and teaching materials and ready-to-use
curricula to make homeschooling an increasingly plausible option for a
greater number of families.11 These factors may also disrupt existing
methods of the production and distribution of education services.
While the full array of policy implications of an important shift in
authority over school assignments from governments to parents remains
far from clear, the rough contours of a few tentative consequences have
emerged. One likely consequence is that while federal and state governments may succeed in retaining decisionmaking and policy control over
the operation of public and private schools, public officials can no longer
simply assume the same level of control over decisions about which
students will attend which schools (public, private, or homeschools).
Increased parental authority over school choice decisions complicates
governments’ decisions relating to school ﬁnance. Increased parental
control also contributes to and reﬂects an increased degree of consumerism in the education space, as well as an increased desire to lever
market forces in the service of education, whether public or private.
Finally, increased parental consumerism and a greater inﬂuence of market forces in the education space will likely continue to both inform and
disrupt how education services are presently produced and distributed.
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I describes how federalism and
separation of power boundaries in the education context remain both
ﬂuid and increasingly contested, and it places recent federal forays into
elementary and secondary education into their proper historical context.
Part II notes the steady growth of parental choices in the school setting
over time and the persistence of its growth despite the enduring
jurisdictional squabbles among federal, state, and local governments over
education policy. Part III develops the claim that a focus on vertical and
horizontal separation of power concerns in general and education federalism in particular risks missing a more profound change in the education policy landscape. Specifically, parents’ growing calls for greater agency
and control over their children’s education and school options will likely
eclipse political ﬁghting over education federalism in terms of importance. The Conclusion notes that the migration of control over education control from all levels of government to parents and students
represents a profound structural reallocation of power between govern-

11. See infra section II.A.3.
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ments and their citizens when it comes to elementary and secondary
education.
I. EDUCATION FEDERALISM’S DYNAMIC FLUIDITY
Despite a tradition, or at least a conventional myth, of local control
that dominated education federalism for decades,12 federalism boundaries are increasingly noted for their ﬂuidity in the public education
sector. Not only are federalism boundaries becoming increasingly ﬂuid,
but the pace of change to these boundaries has also quickened over time,
no doubt a reﬂection of increasingly contested federalism claims. Since
the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, for example, two separate federal
laws, the No Child Left Behind Act of 200113 and Every Student Succeeds
Act of 2015,14 dramatically restructured the balance of power between
the federal government and state and local governments. In addition, two
separate “Dear Colleague” letters involving the U.S. Department of
Education sought, at least implicitly, to redraw separation of power
boundaries between the federal government’s executive and legislative
branches.15
While education federalism disputes raise both vertical and horizontal
separation of power concerns, most scholars emphasize the former. As a
consequence, the conventional understanding of the term “education
federalism” has evolved quickly into code for, at bottom, a demand for an
increased federal role in elementary and secondary education.16 Certainly,
for those whose education federalism frame is informed by a normative
preference for a greater federal role, recent scholarly accounts of education federalism remain increasingly—and largely—negative. According
to Professor Kristi Bowman, for example, and with a particular eye on the
school ﬁnance context, “Education federalism is failing our children.”17
Others similarly dismiss education federalism as having “hampered past
efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity as the nation considers

12. For evidence of the Supreme Court’s recognition of and respect for local control,
see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721, 752 (1974) (holding a federal court may
not “impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation
problem absent any ﬁnding that the other included school districts” also fostered such
segregation within the district in question); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (holding Texas’s public school ﬁnance system should be given
deference under strict scrutiny review). But see, e.g., Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr.,
American Schools and the Future of Local Control, 77 Pub. Int. 77, 77 (1984)
(questioning the “legend” surrounding local control over K–12 education policy).
13. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
14. Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
15. See infra section I.B.
16. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 102); Bowman, supra
note 7 (manuscript at 3); Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 1.
17. Bowman, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3).
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adopting new efforts to achieve this vital national goal.”18 Finally, with
speciﬁc reference to the recently enacted ESSA, Professor Derek Black
warns that federal disengagement with K–12 education in favor of the
states poses a fundamental threat to America’s goal of and promise for
equal educational opportunity.19
A.

Vertical Separation of Powers

Successive substantial federal legislative forays into the K–12
education sector since 2000 reveal persistent unease with—and uncertainty about—the federal government’s proper policy role in the K–12
education setting. These federal legislative forays imply dramatically
different views about vertical separation of power and, as a consequence,
illustrate how education federalism boundaries have changed and how
the velocity of change has increased over time.
1. Pre-No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). — Professor Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson notes, “Education federalism in the United States traditionally
embraces state and local authority over education and a restricted federal
role.”20 Moreover, judicial decisions have traditionally supported state
and local primacy in the education realm.21 This deference to state and
local control over schools was far from total, however, and began to
erode over time. Incident to President Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” in
1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
(ESEA).22 While ESEA reﬂected a bold extension of federal authority
into the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools, the Act and
other legislation also directed new federal funding to discrete subpools
of disadvantaged students. For example, ESEA’s Title I focused federal
resources on the educational needs of students from low-income
families,23 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act targeted federal funds for
students with special needs,24 and Title IX helped ensure that students
were not discriminated against by virtue of their gender.25

18. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 331.
19. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 133) (noting the shift of
power toward states is cause for concern in light of the states’ track records on equal
educational opportunity absent federal intervention).
20. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 287.
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
23. See, e.g., President Lyndon B. Johnson, Johnson’s Remarks on Signing the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (Apr. 11, 1965), http://www.lbjlibrary.org/
lyndon-baines-johnson/timeline/johnsons-remarks-on-signing-the-elementary-and-secondaryeducation-act [http://perma.cc/F3RX-EUDV] (“[ESEA] represents a major new commitment of the federal government to quality and equality in the schooling that we offer our
young people.” (emphasis added)).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
25. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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It is one thing for federal programs to focus on discrete student
subpools, but it is quite another for federal programs to engage with
broader elementary and secondary education policy. And while early
federal legislation began targeting speciﬁc subpools of students, it wasn’t
until 1994 and the passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act
(IASA)26 that Congress widened its regulatory scope and posture and
took aim at broader policy issues (for example, states’ standards and
assessments) that implicated all elementary and secondary schools and
students. Despite the federal government’s increasingly robust policy
presence in K–12 schools, prior to 2000 and NCLB’s emergence, the
thrust of the federal government’s involvement was generally targeted to
speciﬁc policy objectives and discrete student subpools. It is worth
noting, however, that a characterization of Congress’s policymaking role
in K–12 education up to 2001 that emphasizes its limitations is not meant
to diminish the federal government’s important and growing presence in
the nation’s schools. For example, one critical facet of a multidecade
and, to some extent, ongoing effort to desegregate and integrate public
schools played out in the nation’s federal courts.27
2. The No Child Left Behind Act. — Regardless of how one chooses to
frame the federal government’s traditional role in K–12 education prior
to NCLB, few quibble with the proposition that NCLB introduced a
qualitatively new degree and breadth of federal engagement with
education policy.28 Having previously required states to develop,
articulate, and implement their own academic standards and assessments
in 1994, fewer than ten years later, in 2001, Congress, in a bipartisan
effort, set out to establish a federal statute that sought to close and,
indeed, eliminate persistent academic achievement gaps among various
subpools of students. The resulting legislation, NCLB, reﬂected perhaps
the broadest, deepest, and most signiﬁcant federal foray into the
elementary and secondary school domain.29
NCLB’s legal and policy signiﬁcance ﬂows partly from its vast scope,
which implicated every public K–12 school regardless of whether the
school received Title I funding.30 In exchange for the promise of
26. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994).
27. For one recent discussion of this point, see, e.g., Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated
Education and the Role of the Federal Government, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 725, 730 (2010)
(describing the powerful Brown v. Board of Education mandate in a discussion of the federal
government’s role in school integration). See generally Richard Kluger, Simple Justice:
The History of Brown v. Board Of Education and Black America’s Struggle For Equality
(1977) (discussing the historical and legal context of Brown v. Board of Education).
28. See, e.g., Robinson, Disrupting, supra note 4, at 966.
29. See, e.g., Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 322–23.
30. NCLB involves every state because all receive some level of federal Title I
funding. See Revised ESEA Title I LEA Allocations—FY 2016, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://
www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/titlei/fy16/index.html [http://perma.cc/Y63J-GMRG]
(last visited Aug. 29, 2017) (presenting the Title I allocations for each state, plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, in the 2016 ﬁscal year). For a helpful summary of
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additional federal ﬁnancial support, NCLB required states to meet a
series of outcome-based student-achievement benchmarks.31 The engine
that drove this exchange relied on fuel supplied by state-determined
standard-and-assessment regimes.32 The ignition spark involved federally
enforced accountability measures that pivoted on determinations of
adequate yearly progress for student academic achievement33 measured
by annual student testing.34 In so doing, however, Congress “substantially
expanded and restructured the federal role in elementary and secondary
education and . . . ultimately shaped a new educational federalism.”35
In the service of the federal government’s effort to help improve
student achievement and close nagging achievement gaps, NCLB reset
the education federalism boundary in a manner substantially more
favorable to federal authority. Mindful that federalism boundaries still
existed and aware of the Supreme Court’s Dole test36 in particular, federal
lawmakers self-consciously sought to avoid constitutional overreach in
crafting NCLB. For example, rather than impose a single, uniform
federal student assessment measure upon states, NCLB instead required
the states themselves to develop such assessments37 and submit them for
federal approval.38 One aspect that came closest to an imposition of a
federal test, mandating state participation in the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) testing program,39 notably did not trigger
any NCLB consequences for either states or districts. It is important to
note that “[r]egardless of the reasons and motivations for Congress’s
decisions, even NCLB’s harshest critics must applaud the strategic genius
it embodies: an elegant use of political-economic leverage that generates
policy coercion upon states that extends far beyond the reach of NCLB
funds.”40

NCLB’s key parts, see James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 939–43 (2004) [hereinafter Ryan, Perverse Incentives] (arguing
NCLB pursues laudable goals but generates important, unexpected consequences).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2012). For a helpful overview see generally Ryan, Perverse
Incentives, supra note 30.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1).
33. Id. § 6311(b)(2).
34. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(G).
35. Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 323. However, some scholars view NCLB as
merely “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.” See, e.g., Lorraine M. McDonnell, No
Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?, 80
Peabody J. Educ. 19, 21 (2005) (suggesting NCLB did not revolutionize federal education
policy, but rather was a new version of a type of policy that has historical roots).
36. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (outlining factors for a
court to consider when determining the constitutionality of congressional action under
the Spending Clause).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3).
38. Id. § 6311(a)(1).
39. Id. § 6311(c)(2).
40. Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at 141.
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NCLB deftly navigated the conditional spending authority requirements articulated by the Court’s then-interpretation of South Dakota v.
Dole.41 By strategically leveraging limited federal authority and applying
this authority to the standards and assessments that the states themselves
developed and implemented through NCLB, the U.S. Department of
Education accomplished indirectly what, in all likelihood, it could not
have regulated directly.42
Even a nimble (and, candidly, creative and entrepreneurial) exercise
of federal authority cannot easily escape important federalism questions,
however. NCLB raised—but did not squarely confront—a critical
structural education federalism question: whether to decouple education
policy authority and funding responsibility. More speciﬁcally, NCLB
raised the question of whether, from a policy perspective, it is prudent to
permit the federal government to inﬂuence elementary and secondary
school policy beyond the extent of the federal government’s ﬁnancial
contribution to state and local school district budgets.
While some understood NCLB as a creative—if unusually aggressive—
use of federal authority, other scholars were not as generous in their
assessments. For example, then-Professor James Ryan (now Dean of
Harvard’s Graduate School of Education) zeroed in on the very factor
that—while probably necessary for NCLB to claim sufficient constitutional authority and likely necessary for political passage—nonetheless
generated criticism. What Ryan found particularly troublesome about
NCLB was that, although it assigned the federal government authority to
sanction states for failing to meet academic standards and assessments, it
assigned to states the right to deﬁne student assessment thresholds.43
Ryan went on to note that resolving NCLB’s internal structural problem
would have required the federal government to “get off the federalism
fence.”44 In the end, some of NCLB’s structural problems—whether
necessitated by federalism concerns or not—became quickly exposed as
states, confronting the perceived or real threat of federal sanctions for
failing to achieve adequate yearly progress, transformed academic standards
41. See id. at 130–35 (arguing that NCLB stresses—though does not necessarily
violate—the conditional spending requirements articulated in Dole).
42. In the interest of full disclosure, I was among those who argued that NCLB was
not necessarily unconstitutional. My argument at that time assumed that NCLB did not
impermissibly coerce state and local school districts because its conditional spending was
better understood as a reimbursement rather than as a regulatory mandate. I concluded
that while NCLB certainly pushed the envelope of education federalism boundaries
through its strategic use of political-economic leverage, it did not constitute an
unconstitutional act of statutory coercion despite evidence of the Act’s “coercion” plainly
visible in the education policy domain. See id. at 156.
43. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 944; James E. Ryan, The Tenth
Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of Education Governance, in
Who’s in Charge Here?: The Tangled Web of School Governance and Policy 43, 53–54
(Noel Epstein ed., 2004); see also Robinson, High Cost, supra note 7, at 325.
44. Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 987.
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and assessments setting authority into a “race to the bottom.”45 This
policy outcome, a net reduction in state assessment thresholds, while
perhaps inevitable, defeated NCLB’s broad policy objectives.
3. Pushing NCLB to (or Beyond) Federalism’s Breaking Point. — Even
many of NCLB’s critics did not fully anticipate the federal government’s
next legal move. Under NCLB, states were statutorily obligated to make
adequate yearly progress toward 100% student proﬁciency in English and
math by 2014.46 However, such a statutory mandate was, as Professor
Black describes, “unrealistic under any circumstances.”47 As NCLB’s obligations “came due” for many states—something conceptually analogous
to a “balloon mortgage”48 preparing to explode—what became obvious
to all, particularly the states, was that without statutory relief, virtually all
states were in jeopardy of losing eligibility for federal funding, which
constitutes roughly ten percent of an average school district’s budget.49
Indeed, by 2012, eighty percent of the nation’s public schools were
predicted to fail to achieve adequate yearly progress under NCLB and,
thus, were exposed to an array of consequences under federal law.50
Absent congressional reauthorization, NCLB was set to automatically
expire in 2007.51 Many states’ difficulties with meeting their own proﬁciency benchmarks made it abundantly clear to most observers that
NCLB’s reauthorization would involve more than mere tinkering and,

45. For a discussion and examples, see Heise, Political Economy, supra note 7, at
143–47; Paul T. O’Neill, High Stakes Testing Law and Litigation, 2003 BYU Educ. & L.J.
623, 657–59 (discussing suburban backlashes against standardized testing); Paul E. Peterson
& Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards, Educ. Next, Summer 2008, at
70, 73 (“[A]t the 8th-grade level, standards are falling across the board—in both reading
and math.”); see also Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 948 n.77; David J. Hoff,
States Revise the Meaning of ‘Proficient,’ Educ. Wk. (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2002/10/09/06tests.h22.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Diana
Jean Schemo, Sidestepping of New School Standards Is Seen, N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/15/us/sidestepping-of-new-school-standards-is-seen.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
46. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(b)(2)(F), 115 Stat. 1425, 1440 (2002); see also Black,
Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 115); Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter
Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1723, 1752–56 (2012) [hereinafter
Black, Lessons].
47. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 117); see also Black, Lessons,
supra note 46, at 1752–56.
48. Under traditional “balloon” mortgages, a large percentage of the loan’s remaining
principle is due at the end of the mortgage period. For a discussion of how this concept—
back-ending requirements—applies in the NCLB context, see, e.g., Andrew Spitser, School
Reconstitution Under No Child Left Behind: Why School Officials Should Think Twice, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 1339, 1379–83 (2007).
49. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 118 n.113) (citing Derek W.
Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 611 (2015) [hereinafter
Black, Federalizing]).
50. See Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1753–57.
51. No Child Left Behind Act § 1002.
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instead, require a substantial statutory overhaul.52 The ﬁnancial crisis and
health care reform legislation certainly contributed to a political climate
that resulted in inattention to and a delay of NCLB’s necessary reauthorization.53
A political inability or unwillingness to reauthorize NCLB, combined
with a growing number of states’ failure to achieve adequate yearly progress, set up an inevitable political collision.54 This collision approached,
accelerated by a swelling political backlash against NCLB.55 Perhaps
sensing a policy opening or frustrated with Congress’s neglect of NCLB’s
needed reauthorization, the Obama Administration began to leverage
NCLB ever further. Speciﬁcally, in 2011, Education Secretary Arne
Duncan implemented a policy of granting states relief from NCLB in the
form of administrative waivers.56 Even more troubling, however, was that
Secretary Duncan imposed conditions on those states requesting federal
regulatory waivers. For states, the political “price” of a waiver included an
agreement to adopt speciﬁc favored federal education policies, notably
the Common Core Standards.57 As even ardent supporters of a robust
federal presence in K–12 education concede, Secretary Duncan’s waiver
actions lacked “any speciﬁc legislative authority.”58 As a consequence of
his actions, and untethered from federal law, Secretary Duncan succeeded in federalizing “core aspects of education in just a few short
months.”59
By using the administrative waiver process as “a substitute for the
legislative process,” the Obama Administration functionally worked around
traditional lawmaking institutions, notably Congress, and, in so doing,
redrew separation of power boundaries and encroached upon states’
sovereignty.60 Anxious to avoid the stigma of having schools labeled by

52. See Black, Lessons, supra note 46, at 1756 (noting NCLB set unrealistic performance expectations that were unlikely to be met by states).
53. See Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 120).
54. Id. (noting during the 2011–2012 school year approximately “80 percent of the
nation’s schools would fail to meet [NCLB’s] requirements”).
55. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding
the Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & Educ. 1, 29 (2010)
(discussing reasons for backlash against NCLB, which included the lack of national
curriculum and limited district control over academic objectives because of NCLB’s focus
on test-driven behaviors).
56. See 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012) (waiving statutory and regulatory requirements);
see also id. § 6316 (outlining the school improvement process and the onerous corrective
actions imposed on schools that fail to meet achievement targets).
57. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 611; see also Judson N. Kempson,
Comment, Star-Crossed Lovers: The Department of Education and the Common Core, 67
Admin. L. Rev. 595, 607–18 (2015).
58. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 613.
59. Id. at 611.
60. Id. at 648.
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NCLB as “failing,” states had much at stake ﬁnancially and politically.61
As such, these states were unusually vulnerable to the federal government’s use of political leverage. Not surprisingly, states quickly agreed to
the Secretary’s policy terms and conditions that attached to the
regulatory waivers. By October 2013, the Department of Education had
approved waiver applications for forty-three of the forty-ﬁve requesting
states and the District of Columbia.62 Ironically, whatever short-term gains
the states may have realized, the costs were not inconsequential.
Speciﬁcally, the states’ agreement to implement the federal government’s
preferred Common Core Standards emerged as a vibrant political issue
that then-candidate Donald Trump exploited to his political beneﬁt.63
While reasonable minds can and do differ over the efficacy of the
Obama Administration’s particular use of regulatory waivers in the NCLB
context, the tactic clearly raises important questions about basic
federalism structure, including judicially enforced lines articulated in
conditional spending decisions.64 While some scholars approve of the
imposition of policy conditions in exchange for federal regulatory
waivers for an array of policy silos,65 such practices typically survive
constitutional scrutiny only when carefully crafted supporting legislative
authority exists.66 According to Professor Black, however, Secretary
Duncan “lacked that authority.”67 As such, the legislative workarounds
pursued by Secretary Duncan in the education context fundamentally
differed from analogous legislative workarounds in other policy domains.
And this fundamental difference underscores the federalism concerns
raised by the federal regulatory waivers from NCLB. Consequently, the
federalization of education policy in the Obama Administration, however
“momentous,” remained “legally unfounded.”68 More speciﬁcally, in
addition to separation of power and federalism concerns, Secretary
Duncan’s use of conditional waiver authority in this manner also may
61. See Ryan, Perverse Incentives, supra note 30, at 955–57 (noting NCLB “imposes
swifter and harsher sanctions than most state systems”).
62. Morgan S. Polikoff et al., Am. Enter. Inst., Grading the No Child Left Behind
Waivers 4 (2014), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/-education-outlook214_140305366436.pdf [http://perma.cc/BHE6-94EG]. See generally David J. Barron &
Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 325–27 (2013)
(discussing Congress’s decision to grant the Department of Education the power to waive
NCLB requirements).
63. While a candidate, President Trump repeatedly attacked Common Core and
vowed to eliminate it if elected. See, e.g., Lisa Hagen, Trump Education Pick to Face
Warren, Sanders, Hill (Jan. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/
314292-trump-education-pick-to-face-warren-sanders [http://perma.cc/8DDP-XPCN].
64. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (“What
Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
65. See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 62, at 334–35.
66. See id. at 312–18.
67. Black, Federalizing, supra note 49, at 611.
68. Id.
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have violated the Spending Clause by, in essence, “chang[ing] the rules
of the game in unexpected ways.”69
4. The Every Student Succeeds Act. — Once Congress refocused its
attention to K–12 education legislation, it elected to replace rather than
reauthorize NCLB. Years of legislative inattention, combined with an
unusually aggressive use of waiver authority, fueled ESSA’s enactment.70
While much about ESSA and its full effects has not yet emerged, the
implications for educational federalism boundaries are already palpable.
According to one of ESSA’s key sponsors, Tennessee Republican Senator
Lamar Alexander, ESSA represents a “signiﬁcant devolution of power”
over K–12 schooling from the federal government to the states.71
One critical way that ESSA departs from NCLB and enhances states’
power is by permitting them to develop, test, and measure academic
metrics and standards. Aside from a requirement for standards to be
“challenging” (notably left undeﬁned), ESSA now delegates to the states
the task of developing academic standards. And in direct response to the
Obama Administration’s use of conditional waivers, ESSA expressly permits those states that previously adopted Common Core standards—
whether in exchange for regulatory relief or not—to withdraw and
replace those academic standards.72
More dramatic differences between NCLB and ESSA exist in the
accountability domain. Actual consequences for failure to achieve adequate annual testing results typically reside at the structural core of any
accountability regime. To this end, one of NCLB’s pillars was that it held
states and districts accountable for failures to achieve adequate yearly
progress,73 and the consequences became increasingly severe for persistent failures.74 Indeed, in many ways, the political pressure from a growing number of states and districts worried about their exposure under
NCLB helps explain the states’ appetite for the Obama Administration’s
unusually aggressive use of regulatory waivers.
In comparison to NCLB, ESSA affords states far greater latitude in
annual test results’ deployment. Under ESSA states are now free to dilute
69. Id. at 615.
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing states’ heavy reliance on
the regulatory waivers).
71. Alyson Klein, ESSA Architect Q&A: Sen. Lamar Alexander, R-Tenn., Educ. Wk.:
Politics K–12 (June 13, 2016), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2016/
06/essa_architect_q_a_sen_lamar_a.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
72. Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 8544, 129 Stat. 1802, 2119 (2015); see also Jessica BulmanPozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va. L. Rev. 953, 989–91 (2016)
(ﬁnding that “[i]n substance, the ESSA renders ‘null and void’ the waivers granted in
recent years by the Department of Education to states and consortia”).
73. See, e.g., Spitser, supra note 48, at 1364–66 (describing the adverse consequences
triggered by NCLB).
74. Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1116(b)(5), 115 Stat. 1425, 1482–83 (2002); see also Heise,
Political Economy, supra note 7, at 135.
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yearly testing results’ weight when it comes to annual school, district, and
teacher performance.75 That is, ESSA largely relieves states and districts
from the federal consequences that ﬂow from inadequate yearly student
academic progress. In its place, ESSA imposes potential federal sanctions
and requires states to intervene in only a discrete, small subset of schools:
those in the bottom ﬁve percent of a state and those high schools with
graduation rates below sixty-seven percent.76 Nesting standards-setting
and accountability mechanisms in federal authority under NCLB was
among NCLB’s hallmarks. ESSA, in contrast, affords states greater
autonomy, both in terms of control over substantive standards setting and
the consequences for states that fail to achieve their own self-deﬁned
achievement goals.
Finally, in a largely symbolic—though nonetheless notable—gesture,
ESSA expressly limits the ability of the U.S. Secretary of Education to
reject or impose conditions upon state-initiated remediation plans.77 Recall
that during Duncan’s tenure as Education Secretary, the Department of
Education engaged in what even his supporters acknowledge was an
aggressive use of conditional waiver granting that, at once, relieved most
states from unwelcome adverse consequences for failing to achieve adequate yearly progress under NCLB and induced states to implement a
federal preference for Common Core standards.78 Rather than permit
similar statutory “end-runs” by future Education Secretaries, ESSA expressly
eliminated the waiver activity that took place earlier in the Obama
Administration.79
Despite ample evidence illustrating how ESSA increases state authority
and autonomy, it is important to note the parts of ESSA that preserve
and, indeed, increase certain federal roles. For example, ESSA focuses
federal attention on the bottom ﬁve percent of schools within each state
as well as those high schools struggling with graduation rate problems.80
Again, from a federalism perspective the juxtaposition of NCLB and
ESSA’s scope could not be starker—the former functionally implicated
every K–12 school while the latter restricts federal obligations to only ﬁve
percent of a state’s schools. ESSA’s narrowed statutory focus is important
for policy and political reasons. On the policy level, a focus on the lowestperforming schools may generate the necessary attention to those schools
75. Every Student Succeeds Act § 1005.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 8014.
78. See supra section I.A.3.
79. Every Student Succeeds Act § 4(c). In limiting federal oversight, ESSA also
reprimands the Department of Education (which nonetheless supported the bill) with
descriptions of the many forms of authority the Department may not exercise. See, e.g., id.
§ 1005 (“The Secretary shall not have the authority to mandate, direct, control, coerce, or
exercise any direction or supervision over any of the challenging State academic standards
adopted or implemented by a State.”); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 989–90.
80. Every Student Succeeds Act § 1005.
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most in need. On the political front, such a focus keeps the remaining
ninety-five percent of schools within a state outside of the federal statute’s
crosshairs.
Moreover, while ESSA severely restricts the Secretary of Education’s
authority, some vestiges of federal oversight endure. Although states are
now charged with devising their own accountability goals, states must still
submit these goals to the Department of Education.81 Finally, in one
discrete context—preschool education—federal policy authority increased.82
On balance, however, ESSA clearly reverses the previous educational
federalism boundaries established by NCLB. While NCLB may have
functionally “federalized” K–12 education policy, ESSA is noted principally for redirecting education policy from the federal government back
to the states.83 According to one of the leading Senate sponsors of ESSA,
Senator Alexander, a resetting of education federalism boundaries in this
direction was entirely consistent with the legislative intent.84
What to make of this education federalism boundary shift remains
contested. Some applaud ESSA’s reallocation of federal–state power in
the K–12 sector on purely structural and historic grounds.85 Others, while
acknowledging states’ greater authority under ESSA, fear the secondary
and tertiary consequences threatened by an increase in state autonomy
and a corresponding decrease in federal control.86 According to its
critics, who are not difficult to ﬁnd, ESSA “moves education in a
direction that was unthinkable just a few short years ago: no deﬁnite
equity provisions, no demands for speciﬁc student achievement, and no
enforcement mechanism to prompt states to consistently pursue equity
or achievement.”87
Despite differing opinions on the implications of the migration from
NCLB to ESSA for education federalism, many agree that the latter
81. See id.
82. See id. § 921.
83. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103); see also Betheny Gross &
Paul T. Hill, The State Role in K–12 Education: From Issuing Mandates to
Experimentation, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 299, 299 (2016) (noting ESSA “intended to
return policy authority back to legislatures, governors, and state education agencies”).
84. See supra text accompanying note 71. Notably, Senator Alexander served as
Secretary of Education from 1991–1993 during the George H.W. Bush Administration.
Alexander, Lamar, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=a000360 [http://perma.cc/XR22-VBLT] (last visited Aug. 28,
2017).
85. See, e.g., Gross & Hill, supra note 83, at 322–24 (arguing that under ESSA states
may accelerate progress toward more effective schools).
86. See, e.g., Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103–06) (emphasizing
the negative impacts of ESSA on low-income students and equal educational opportunity);
Deena Dulgerian, The Impact of the Every Student Succeeds Act on Rural Schools, 24
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 111, 130–35 (2016) (describing ESSA’s adverse consequences
on rural schools).
87. Black, Abandoning, supra note 5 (manuscript at 103).
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reﬂects a more “state-centric law.”88 And if enhancing state autonomy in
the K–12 policy sphere by diluting federal authority were not enough,
ESSA also voids all waivers previously granted by the Department of
Education.89 Indeed, some commentators note that ESSA will, eventually,
“supersede the many waivers offered to some forty-two states to the NCLB
requirements which the Obama administration had used to buy political
time while moving education reform forward.”90
B.

Horizontal Separation of Powers—U.S. Department of Education “Dear
Colleague” Letters

While much of the public attention to Education Secretary Betsy
DeVos’s nomination dwelled on her prior public endorsements of and
support for an array of school choice measures, including charter schools
and vouchers,91 comparatively less appreciated is the Trump Administration’s
posture on horizontal separation of power issues raised by two “Dear
Colleague” letters issued by the Education Department during the Obama
Administration concerning Title IX.
1. School Bathrooms. — In 2016, North Carolina enacted a law,
known as House Bill 2, that, among other things, deﬁned student gender
as a student’s sex assigned at birth (or “biological” sex) for purposes of
access to public school bathrooms.92 The Justice Department under
President Obama informed the North Carolina Governor that the North
Carolina law violated federal antidiscrimination laws.93 Then-Governor
88. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 991 (arguing that ESSA “diminishes
federal involvement in education” and, as compared to NCLB, is a more “state-centric”
law); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text (quoting Senator Alexander
describing ESSA as a “signiﬁcant devolution of power” from the federal government to the
states).
89. Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802, 1806 (2015). For a discussion of the way in
which ESSA addresses the Department of Education’s waiver activity under the Obama
Administration, see Bulman-Pozen, supra note 72, at 990 n.151.
90. Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 281, 291
(2016).
91. See, e.g., Editorial, Big Worries About Betsy DeVos, N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/opinion/big-worries-about-betsy-devos.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“She has poured money into charter schools advocacy,
winning legislative changes that have reduced oversight and accountability. About 80
percent of the charter schools in Michigan are operated by for-proﬁt companies, far
higher than anywhere else.”); see also Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability Through
Procedure? Rethinking Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117
Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1159–61 (2017) (describing ways in which charter schools are
functionally and legally distinct from traditional school districts).
92. An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple Occupancy Bathroom and Changing
Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies and to Create Statewide Consistency in
Regulation of Employment and Public Accommodations, Sess. L. No. 2016-3, § 1.2, 2016
N.C. Sess. Laws 12, 12–13.
93. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–2, McCrory v. United States, No.
5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. ﬁled May 9, 2016) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
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Pat McCrory quickly ﬁled a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief vindicating
his state’s law.94 On that same day, the Justice Department ﬁled its own
lawsuit asking a federal court to declare that the North Carolina law violated federal law.95
While North Carolina subsequently repealed House Bill 2, the
debate it ignited persists.96 On May 13, 2016, the Obama Administration’s
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education (OCR) and Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice released a “Dear Colleague”
letter to all recipient institutions bound by Title IX designed to prohibit
discrimination based on a student’s gender identity.97 Speciﬁcally, the
letter asserts that for Title IX purposes the federal government “treat[s]
a student’s gender identity as the student’s sex.”98
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter expressly purported to provide
“signiﬁcant guidance” rather than expand Title IX’s legal obligations on
schools.99 While the letter implicated an array of school activities and
programs,100 in the public’s mind the issue became quickly joined with
growing disputes over “restroom access” and the implications for transgender students.101 Despite the continued public and growing legal atten(“The United States, through its Department of Justice . . . threatened legal action against
Governor McCrory, Secretary Perry, and others, because plaintiffs intend to follow North
Carolina law requiring public agencies to generally limit use of multiple occupancy
bathroom and changing facilities to persons of the same biological sex.”).
94. Id. at 8–9. This lawsuit, ﬁled by Governor McCrory, was subsequently voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice in light of the Justice Department’s own lawsuit. Plaintiff’s
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice at 3, McCrory, No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO
(E.D.N.C. ﬁled Sept. 16, 2016) (on ﬁle with Columbia Law Review).
95. United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16CV425, 2016 WL 4005839, at *1
(M.D.N.C. July 25, 2016).
96. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Bathroom Law Repeal Leaves Few Pleased in North
Carolina, N.Y. Times (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/northcarolina-senate-acts-to-repeal-restrictive-bathroom-law.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing various interest group reactions to the repeal of House Bill 2).
97. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender
Students 2 (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender Students],
http://www.ed.gov/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [http://perma.cc/
U2FU-PV8Y].
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 1.
100. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.4, 106.31(a) (2016) (requiring that all recipients of federal
funding assure, among other things, that they have not denied any student participation
in any academic, extracurricular, or other educational program or activity on the basis of
sex). Insofar as Title IX addresses an array of “educational programs and activities,” OCR’s
“guidance” extended beyond school bathrooms. Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender
Students, supra note 97, at 1.
101. See Dear Colleague Letter: Transgender Students, supra note 97, at 3 (“A school
may not require transgender students to use [restrooms and locker rooms] inconsistent
with their gender identity or to use individual-user [restrooms and locker rooms] when
other students are not required to do so.”); Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Transgender
Bathroom Debate and the Looming Title IX Crisis, New Yorker (May 24, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/public-bathroom-regulations-could-create-a-
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tion to the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter issued by the Obama
Administration, the Trump Administration quickly withdrew it.102
The current Administration’s withdrawal of the OCR “Dear Colleague”
letter informed ongoing litigation. In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
County School Board, a transgender student sought access to the school
bathroom that corresponded with the student’s gender identity rather
than the student’s at-birth sex assignment.103 The Gloucester County
School Board initially granted the transgender student’s request, but
after some community members expressed disapproval, the Board implemented a policy that limited students to school bathrooms that
correspond with their at-birth sex assignment.104 After the adoption of
the new restroom policy, the student turned to litigation and sought relief
under Title IX.105 The student’s request for a preliminary injunction was
denied by a federal district court, which also concluded that the student
failed to state a legal claim.106
The student’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit, however, proved more
successful. Reversing some evidentiary rulings by the trial court, the
Fourth Circuit also concluded that the OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter
was entitled to some degree of legal deference—speciﬁcally, Auer
deference107—as it evidences the Department of Education’s interpretation
of Title IX.108 The Supreme Court initially stayed the matter. After
agreeing to hear the appeal, the Supreme Court later decided to vacate
and remand the Fourth Circuit’s decision to the appeals court in light of
the current Administration’s withdrawal of the “Dear Colleague” letter,
which ﬁgured so prominently in the Fourth Circuit’s original decision.109

title-ix-crisis [http://perma.cc/9ASK-DC44] (describing the OCR’s “Dear Colleague”
letter and the “clear” threat that “schools that failed to comply could lose federal
funding”).
102. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Withdrawal 1
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3473560/Departments-ofEducation-and-Justice-roll-back.pdf [http://perma.cc/2LSE-ZD7B]. Note that the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal of the Dear Colleague letter on transgender students also
included a withdrawal of a related Department of Education letter from Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Policy James Ferg-Cadima, to Emily Prince, dated January 7, 2015.
Id.
103. 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739–41 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d in part and vacated in part,
822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.).
104. Id. at 740–41.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 744–53.
107. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations is due deference).
108. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 719–24.
109. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017)
(mem.); see also Robert Barnes & Moriah Balingit, Supreme Court Takes up
School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students, Wash. Post (Oct. 28, 2016), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-up-school-bathroom-rules-
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2. Student Sexual Assault. — Earlier, in 2011, the OCR released
another “Dear Colleague” letter, this one involving student sexual
assault.110 Specifically, the Obama Administration’s Education Department
construed sexual assault as sexual “harassment” for purposes of Title
IX.111 As Harvard Law Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen describes in a New
Yorker essay, the OCR letter went on to detail speciﬁcally how schools,
colleges, and universities needed to adapt their student disciplinary
policies and procedures with respect to incidences of alleged sexual
assault, with particular reference to lowering burden of proof standards.112 A recipient institution that failed to comply with Title IX risked
losing federal funding.113
Unlike prior OCR policy guidance, including so-called “signiﬁcant”
policy guidance,114 the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter did not beneﬁt from
formal administrative law notice-and-comment requirements.115 As it
relates to OCR’s particular directive to colleges and universities to reduce
the applicable standard of proof burden to the civil preponderance
threshold in campus sexual assault hearings,116 the OCR sought to justify
its position on the grounds that this was the standard used in Title VII
hearings.117 What makes OCR’s position uncomfortable, however, is that
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter did not also adopt Title VII’s protections
for the accused.118 If that omission were not enough, in an ironic twist
the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter also expressly recommended against
some of the procedural safeguards included in Title VII.119
for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3-d50061aa9fae_story.html?utm_
term=.f1e742c46d6c [http://perma.cc/J865-WT63].
110. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual
Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence], http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [http://perma.cc/GA6V-KR8P].
111. Id. at 1–2.
112. Id. at 11 (“Thus, in order for a school’s grievance procedures to be consistent
with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the evidence standard
(i.e., it is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred).”); see also
Gersen, supra note 101 (describing the April 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter and its
ramiﬁcations).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), (c) (2012). “Recipient institutions” bound by Title IX and
exposed to its sanctions include virtually every accredited college and university in the
United States as well as, by deﬁnition, all public elementary and secondary schools. Id.
§ 1681(c).
114. See Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, supra note 110, at 1 n.1.
115. See Tamara Rice Lave, A Critical Look at How Top College and Universities Are
Adjudicating Sexual Assault, 71 U. Miami L. Rev. 377, 389 (2017) (describing how the
2011 letter did not “post a formal notice requesting feedback” on proposed changes).
116. See Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence, supra note 110, at 11.
117. Id. at 10–11.
118. These protections include, but are not limited to, a right to demand a jury trial,
cross-examine witnesses, and confront the complainant. For a discussion see Lave, supra
note 115, at 390.
119. See id.
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Notwithstanding the procedural and substantive concerns with
OCR’s legal interpretation of Title IX, many schools, colleges, and
universities quickly adopted campus-level policies and practices
consistent with those articulated in the “Dear Colleague” letter.120 What
has ensued, however, includes a string of notable and notably successful
lawsuits against these very schools, colleges, and universities brought by
students accused under the new OCR guidelines complaining of an array
of due process violations.121 As legal and related ﬁnancial exposure
continues to mount for many colleges and universities on this front,122 a
number of higher education administrators, many of whom previously
may have welcomed—indeed, encouraged—OCR’s “guidance,” are now
quickly rethinking their position and beginning to push back against
OCR’s “guidance.” For example, one harbinger is that while Harvard
University adapted its university-wide student sexual assault code to
conform with OCR “guidance,”123 Harvard Law School, alarmed by the
dire due process implications for those accused and subjected to policies
and procedures promoted by the OCR “Dear Colleague” letter, declined
to follow the university’s lead and instead developed and now employs its
own set of policies and procedures that differ in critical ways from the
university-wide approach.124
Indeed, similar to its earlier withdrawal of the “Dear Colleague”
letter implicating school bathrooms, on September 7, 2017, in a widely
anticipated speech, U.S. Education Secretary DeVos announced the
Administration’s decision to “revisit” the legal rules governing what Title
120. See id. at 391–98 (describing ﬁndings from a survey of top colleges and
universities about the procedural protections given to students accused of sexual assault).
121. For a recent comprehensive treatment of this issue and the related litigation see
generally KC Johnson & Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Campus Rape Frenzy: The Attack on Due
Process at America’s Universities (2017).
122. For a brief summary of the growing—and successful—litigation against colleges
and universities, see generally id. at 87–96.
123. See Harvard Univ., Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment Policy (2017), http://
titleix.harvard.edu/files/title-ix/files/harvard_sexual_harassment_policy.pdf?m=1461104544
[http://perma.cc/HZ4S-XHFD] (updating the university’s policies and procedures,
including its deﬁnition of sexual assault, to comply with OCR guidance). For a general
summary, see, e.g., Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement,
128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 103, 107 & n.9, 109 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/vol128_Halley_REVISED_2.17.pdf [http://perma.cc/9N3C-2557].
124. See Harvard Law Sch., Interim Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures,
http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2014/09/hls-titleix-interimpolicy1.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7352-CMRU] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017) (adopting, for the 2014–2015 academic
year, certain aspects of the university policies while changing other features). For
emerging evidence that the Trump Administration is also now rethinking its position on
the Student Sexual Assault “Dear Colleague” letter, see Erica L. Green & Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Campus Rape Policies Get a New Look as the Accused Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y.
Times (July 12, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rapebetsy-devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jackson.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing the Department of Education’s readiness to reexamine Obama-era
policies pertaining to students accused of sexual assault).
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IX requires of schools, colleges, and universities when policing campus
sexual assault.125 Secretary DeVos expressed alarm at too many instances
of “kangaroo courts” on campuses that ill-served accusers and the
accused.126 Notably, she committed to a review process that, consistent
with Administrative Procedure Act requirements, will involve traditional
notice-and-comment of proposed rules. Despite unsurprising criticism
from many interest groups,127 opinion pieces appearing in the New York
Times voiced clear support for Secretary DeVos’ announcement.128 While
it is all but certain that the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Dear
Colleague” letter will be rendered moot by forthcoming actions by the
current Administration, it remains thus far unclear whether Secretary
DeVos will seek to formally withdraw the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter
during the pendency of the Department’s review of Title IX.
3. “Dear Colleague” Letters’ Implications for Horizontal Separation of
Power. — Setting aside the merits of and controversies surrounding
gender-identity and campus sexual-assault policies and procedures,
admittedly important topics, a comparatively underappreciated issue
raised by the OCR “Dear Colleague” letters involves horizontal separation of powers, particularly as related to education federalism. Specifically, the issue revealed an important conﬂict between Congress and the
executive branch over education federalism.
A Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
(HELP) hearing on June 26, 2014, illustrated this conﬂict and featured a
particularly pointed and heated exchange between the Committee Chair,
Senator Alexander, and Catherine Lhamon, an Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights at the Department of Education.129 The protracted interaction focused on technical questions involving OCR’s speciﬁc legal
authority to enact its desired policy changes to Title IX through its 2011
“Dear Colleague” letter. Senator Alexander worried aloud that by dressing
the Department of Education’s demands as “significant guidance,” the
Department was essentially trying to enact new “law” without adhering to
the requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, notably
the requirements for notice and public comment.130 According to Senator
Alexander,
What you’re doing [in the OCR] is writing out detailed
guidance for 22 million students on 7,200 campuses, and it’s
125. See Stephanie Saul & Dana Goldstein, Betsy DeVos Says She Will Rewrite Rules
on Campus Sex Assault, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
09/07/us/devos-campus-rape.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
126. Id.
127. Id. (noting criticism from such groups as the National Women’s Law Center).
128. See Bret Stephens, Opinion, Betsy DeVos Ends a Campus Witch Hunt, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/opinion/betsy-devos-title-iv.html?rref=
collection%2Fcolumn%2Fbret-stephens (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
129. Johnson & Taylor, supra note 121, at 191–94.
130. Id.
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just—it could be your whim, your idea . . . . We [the U.S.
Congress] make the law. You don’t make the law. Where does
such a guidance authority come from?131
Certainly contributing to Lhamon’s misfortune and discomfort was
that Senator Alexander had previously served as the Secretary of
Education from 1991 to 1993 under President George H.W. Bush132 and
as university president from 1988 to 1991 at the University of Tennessee133
and beneﬁts from formal legal training.134 Within a year of Assistant
Secretary Lhamon’s clash with Senator Alexander, OCR officials began to
publicly retreat from their original assertions, as well as from the explicit
text of the “Dear Colleague” letter itself, and ultimately conceded that
OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letters are not, in fact, legally binding upon the
recipient educational institutions despite previous public assertions to
the contrary.135 Substance aside, the series of exchanges involving
Senator Alexander and various OCR officials helpfully distills, isolates,
and identiﬁes conﬂicts that can arise between the legislative and
executive federal branches when it comes to control over federal law.
Increasingly, these conﬂicts involve education federalism.
II. SCHOOL CHOICE’S PERSISTENT GROWTH
In early September 2016, then-candidate Trump announced that, if
elected President, he would transform $20 billion of existing federal
education funds into a block grant to states that could be deployed for
the beneﬁt of private, charter, or public schools.136 President Trump’s
political impulse is one of the more recent—and prominent—political
reﬂections of a persistently growing parental demand for greater choice
when it comes to K–12 education. Evidence of ever-increasing parental
appetite for greater school choice is not hard to ﬁnd.
131. Id.
132. In the interest of full disclosure, I served as then-U.S. Education Secretary Lamar
Alexander’s Deputy Chief of Staff from 1991–1992.
133. About the Office of the President, U. Tenn., http://president.tennessee.edu/
about/ [http://perma.cc/ND3L-BVHW] (last visited Aug. 29, 2017); Alexander, Lamar,
supra note 84. Senator Alexander is a graduate of Vanderbilt University (B.A., 1962) and
NYU Law School (J.D., 1965). Id.
134. See generally Lamar Alexander, Lamar Alexander: U.S. Senator for Tenn.,
http://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/lamaralexander [http://perma.cc/
3X48-A24X] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017).
135. See Examining the Use of Agency Regulatory Guidance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 18–20 (2015) (statement of Sen. Alexander).
136. Diane Ravitch, When Public Goes Private, as Trump Wants: What Happens?, N.Y.
Rev. Books (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/08/when-publicgoes-private-as-trump-wants-what-happens/ [http://perma.cc/D48Z-J7BU] [hereinafter
Ravitch, Private] (reviewing Samuel E. Abrams, Education and the Commercial Mindset
(2016) and Mercedes K. Schneider, School Choice: The End of Public Education?
(2016)).
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Indeed, President Trump’s support for increased school choice
reﬂects a continuation of a political trend that began in earnest long
before President Trump took the oath of office. A gradual shift in the
production and delivery of K–12 education services from a “sectorcentered” perspective to what Professor Nicole Garnett refers to as a
“child-centered” perspective has accelerated over time.137 The array of
factors propelling a net growth in school choice demands includes the
“exponential growth” of charter schools, complemented by a more
recent increase in the availability of publicly funded school voucher
programs.138 Similarly, concurrent increases in homeschool participation
as well as more traditional public schools of choice (for example, magnet
schools) also contribute to net increases in parental demands for
greater autonomy when it comes to school decisions concerning their
children.139
At the same time the supply of school options available to parents
increased, one paradoxical consequence of the recently discarded NCLB
also helped fuel parents’ growing appetite for greater school choice.
Speciﬁcally, one consequence of NCLB’s testing and reporting requirements was that they laid bare persistent academic struggles in numerous
public schools and districts, including some comparatively affluent suburban districts that, until NCLB, were presumed to be performing at a
higher level.140 The increased availability of systematic information,
however modest, about schools’ academic performance propelled more
parents to increase their demands for greater school choices for their
children.
A.

Evidence of Increased School Choice

Given the plethora of school choice options—options that exist
within the public school sphere as well as options between the public and
non-public school markets141—one important, though broad, barometer
137. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation of
Education Law, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2017).
138. Id.; see also Michael J. Petrilli, School Reform Moves to the Suburbs, N.Y. Times
(July 11, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/11/opinion/school-reform-moves-tothe-suburbs.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the negative impact
that certain exceptions and ﬂexible arrangements offered to states will have on suburban
educational achievements).
139. See infra section II.A.1.
140. See Petrilli, supra note 138 (“[S]uburban schools are the most likely to post high
average test scores that mask large gulfs between students of different races or classes . . . .
The law made those achievement gaps transparent . . . .”).
141. To be sure, how to accurately deﬁne school “choice” remains under some
contest. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Elementary and
Secondary Education Enter the “Adapt or Die” Environment of a Competitive
Marketplace, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 75, 96–99 (1995); Michael Heise, Equal Educational
Opportunity and Constitutional Theory: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School
Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J.L. & Pol. 411, 413–14 (1998); Jason C. Seewer,
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of interest in school choice involves changes over time in the percentage
of students attending their government “assigned” public schools. Data
from the U.S. Department of Education make clear that this percentage
has declined from 80% in 1993 to 73% in 2007.142 To put this 7% decline
into some context, the Department of Education reports that in 2013 just
over ﬁfty million students attended public K–12 schools.143 A 7% decline
in students attending their traditional government “assigned” public
schools implies an approximate drop of 3.5 million students over a
ﬁfteen-year period.
Interestingly, the increased availability and flexibility of public funding
helps fuel some of the attendance decline in students’ assigned public
schools. To be sure, ﬂexible public funding enables some families to
attend alternative public school options, such as charter and magnet
schools, which are inter- and intra-district school choices. Other families,
by contrast, use public funds to exercise their Pierce rights and seek out
various non-public school options, including private and private religious
schools, homeschooling, and virtual schools.144 Also notable is the variation of school choice options across the states. A 2013 report from the
Council of Chief State School Officers notes that while all states provide
at least some form of alternative to assigned public schools for some
portion of students, none of the states provide all forms of school choice
options to all students.145 While growth-trend curves differ across various
school choice options, the cumulative effect of these options is evidence
of slow and steady, if uneven, growth over time.146
1. Charter and Magnet Schools. — Public charter schools’ importance
in the school choice movement continues to increase over time. Between
2000 and 2014, the raw number of charter schools more than quadrupled,
from 1,525 to 6,465.147 Not surprisingly, an increase in the number of
Opening the Door: A Proposal for Increased Educational Choice in Detroit, 83 U. Detroit
Mercy L. Rev. 411, 415–16 (2006).
142. Sarah Grady et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Trends in the Use of School
Choice: 1993 to 2007, at 7 fig.1 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010004.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2PYS-HEPC].
143. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 203.10.
Enrollment in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by Level and Grade: Selected
Years, Fall 1980 Through Fall 2026 (2016), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/
tables/dt15_203.10.asp [http://perma.cc/74WC-N8PQ].
144. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (stating the Fourteenth
Amendment protects “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”).
145. Council of Chief State Sch. Officers, School Choice in the States: A Policy
Landscape (2013), http://www.ccsso.org/Documents/2013/Choice_by_State_2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HP2M-5PB2].
146. Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in Exploring
the School Choice Universe: Evidence and Recommendations 39, 41–44 (Gary Miron et al.
eds., 2012) (summarizing the development of school choice initiatives since the 1950s).
147. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.90. Public
Elementary and Secondary Charter Schools and Enrollment, By State: Selected Years,
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charter schools helped fuel a similar increase in the number of students
attending charter schools. Indeed, during these same years, 2000 to 2014,
charter school enrollment increased by more than 740%.148 Finally, and
perhaps most saliently, charter school enrollments grew as a percentage
of total public school enrollment. In 2000, charter school enrollment
accounted for less than 1% of total public school enrollment.149 By 2014,
that percentage grew to 5.1%.150 When one adds public magnet schools
into this mix, the drain on traditional “assigned” public school
enrollment doubles. In 2014, of the 49.7 million students attending
public schools, more than 5 million, or 10 percent of, students chose to
attend charter or magnet public schools—that is, to attend a public
school other than a student’s “assigned” public school.151
Not surprisingly, charter schools vary—sometimes tremendously—
both within and across states.152 Although charter schools are, in a formal
legal sense, public institutions, one trend within the public-charterschool market includes the growing use of private management companies to operate public charter schools.153 Interestingly, the lurch toward
privatization straddles traditional political labels.154 The cumulative effect
of multiple administrations over time, both Republican and Democratic,
is that “there are about seven thousand publicly-funded, privatelymanaged charter schools, enrolling nearly three million students.”155
Charter schools’ signiﬁcant growth should not deﬂect attention
from another genre of intra-district school choice: magnet schools.
Historically, magnet schools’ origins partly reﬂect public school districts’
(typically larger urban public districts) desire to increase desegregation
and student achievement through schools that usually feature particular

1999–2000 Through 2013–2014 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/
tables/dt15_216.90.asp [http://perma.cc/7SZN-5E3S].
148. Id. (indicating charter school enrollment increased from 339,678 to 2,519,065
between 2000 and 2014).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.20. Number
and Enrollment of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by School Level, Type, and
Charter and Magnet Status: Selected Years, 1990–91 Through 2013–14 (2015),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_216.20.asp [http://perma.cc/343M-B39S].
152. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 Stan. J. C.R. &
C.L. 393, 394–95 (2008).
153. See generally Preston C. Green III et al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter
Schools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63
Emory L.J. 303 (2013) (highlighting the ways in which charter schools have used
educational-management organizations and other private entities to obtain more funding
from the public sector).
154. For one illustration, see, e.g., Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle
Over School Choice 15–43 (2003).
155. Ravitch, Private, supra note 136, at 58.
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academic focus or curricular orientation.156 While magnet schools vary in
terms of their focus and efficacy, they remain an attractive option for
many families.157 Indeed, both the raw number of magnet schools as well
as the number of students attending them more than doubled between
2001 and 2014.158 Despite magnet schools’ variety, for purposes of this
Essay, the two key characteristics that bind them are that they dislodge
students away from geographically assigned public schools and provide
parents and students with additional education options.159
2. Private Schools and Voucher Programs. — Once-stable private
religious and secular school enrollment (as measured by private school
enrollment as a percentage of total school enrollment) has, since the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, displayed evidence of a slight decline. Between 1995
and 2007, the private school enrollment percentage decreased from
11.7% to 10.7%.160 Beginning in 2009, and through 2013, the percentage
dipped to 9.8%.161 The percentage decline, however, should not obscure
private school’s important market share of America’s school children.
Despite any recent minor comparative market-share decline, the total
number of students participating in private school choice programs “has
more than tripled in the last decade to 350,000 students in 2014–
2015.”162 Among private school selections in 2013, families overwhelm-

156. See, e.g., Ellen Goldring & Claire Smrekar, Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of
Racial Balance, 33 Educ. & Urb. Soc’y 17, 21 (2000) (discussing a study that found “wholeschool magnet programs (in which all students must choose the school) were the most
successful in meeting desegregation goals when compared with programs in schools or
mixed models of magnets and attendance zone magnets”); Kimberly C. West, A
Desegregation Tool That Backﬁred: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 103 Yale
L.J. 2567, 2568 (1994) (arguing the failure to consider classroom racial composition, and
instead the reliance on school-wide racial composition, is a cause of the inefficacy of
desegregation efforts in magnet schools); see also Janet R. Price & Jane R. Stern, Magnet
Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School Reform, 5 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 291, 292
(1987) (“The key characteristics of a magnet school are: (1) a distinctive school
curriculum organized around a special theme or method of instruction; (2) voluntary
enrollment elected by students and their parents; and (3) students drawn from many
attendance zones.”).
157. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 216.20. Number
and Enrollment of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by School Level, Type, and
Charter and Magnet Status: Selected Years, 1990–91 Through 2013–14 (2015),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_216.20.asp [http://perma.cc/343M-B39S].
158. Id.
159. For a brief overview see, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2064–65.
160. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 205.10. Private
Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment and Private Enrollment as a Percentage of
Total Enrollment in Public and Private Schools, by Region and Grade Level: Selected
Years, Fall 1995 Through Fall 2013 (2016), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/
d15/tables/dt15_205.10.asp [http://perma.cc/A2FS-MQWT].
161. Id.
162. Garnett, supra note 137, at 27.
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ingly chose religious-affiliated schools over sectarian schools (68.1%
versus 31.9%, respectively).163
Voucher programs, both publicly and privately funded, seek, in part,
to reduce barriers to the private school market for families.164 Early
voucher programs tended to focus on either students from low-income
households or students assigned to struggling public schools or both. By
navigating critical open constitutional questions at that time,165 some
early privately funded voucher programs operated as de facto pilot
programs and, in addition to serving students and their families, set out
to generate data and political support and increase the constituency for
broader, more comprehensive publicly funded voucher programs.166
Contributing much to the recent growth in publicly funded voucher
programs is a shift in voucher programs’ initial focus on students from
low-income households and those assigned to struggling public schools
to a broader slice of middle-class students. While political realities
typically prompted publicly and privately funded voucher programs to
focus on those students most in need of additional school choices, as the
politics surrounding school choice has evolved so too has voucher
programs’ focus. Now, ironically, successful political support for voucher
programs typically requires that the programs include middle-class families
as well.167
The often-uneasy relations between the private-school-voucher and
charter-school movements also continue to inject political complexities
into the school choice debate. While early privately funded voucher
programs sought to stimulate the development of publicly funded
163. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 205.30.
Percentage Distribution of Students Enrolled in Private Elementary and Secondary
Schools, by School Orientation and Selected Characteristics: Fall 2011 and Fall 2013
(2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_205.30.asp [http://perma.cc/
7THV-Y69S].
164. For a discussion of some of the early major privately funded voucher programs,
see generally Private Vouchers (Terry M. Moe ed., 1995). While various states and locales
experimented with publicly funded voucher programs, leading up to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zellman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), one expression of federal
support for publicly funded vouchers included the District of Columbia’s Opportunity
Scholarship Program, incident to the D.C. School Choice Incentive Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 126 (2004). The Opportunity Scholarship Program was
reauthorized in 2011 as the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 11210, 125 Stat. 199 (2011). For purposes of this discussion, I construe “private school
voucher programs” quite broadly to include an array of technically distinct though
analytically similar programs (for example, vouchers, tuition tax credits, and educationsavings accounts).
165. Speciﬁcally, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zellman.
166. See generally Terry M. Moe, Private Vouchers, in Private Vouchers supra note
164, at 1, 7–9 (stating the “resort to privately funded vouchers is essentially an adaptation
to political reality”).
167. See Garnett, supra note 137, at 26–27 (noting a recent surge in voucher or choice
programs that have far broader scope than earlier programs).
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voucher programs, one consequence was an acceleration of public
charter schools’ popularity.168 As the specter of increased school choice
grew, so too did political resistance to it.169 And this political resistance
uncovered unexpected alliances between, for example, teacher unions,
reacting to the threat posed by increased private school enrollments, and
traditionally “suburban Republicans,” who are, in general, content with
their public schools and threatened by the prospect of increasing access
to them for lower-income urban students.170 As Professor Garnett notes,
however, it remains possible that, in the end, the surge in charter schools
and their popularity will bleed over into increased political support for
school-voucher programs.171
3. Homeschooling and Online Education. — While presently the least
signiﬁcant in terms of the raw number of students served, homeschooling represents another and increasingly important threat to publicschool market share. In the homeschool sector, it is difficult to
overestimate the inﬂuence of technological advances and the growing
supply of and access to high quality education content, particularly the
development of “turn-key” online education content.172 The interaction
of these two factors has made homeschooling an increasingly plausible
option for a far greater percentage of American families, both in terms of
cost and execution. Given technological advances as well as dramatic
increases in online content availability, it is not surprising that the
Department of Education reports that from 2003 to 2012 the percentage
of homeschooled K–12 students in the United States increased from
2.2% to 3.4%, and the raw number of homeschooled children increased
by almost 62%.173
168. See Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1917, 1931 (2012) (noting it “is
ironic from a policy perspective . . . that many school voucher supporters . . . made clear
their desire for such programs to stimulate broader, comprehensive publicly-funded
voucher programs”).
169. See generally Ryan & Heise, supra note 9 (noting the signiﬁcance of historical
suburban resistance to school desegregation and school-ﬁnance reform).
170. See Garnett, supra note 137, at 25 (noting suburban Republicans are generally
“happy with their public schools and unhappy about the prospect of poor urban students
enrolling in them”); Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2045, 2080 (“Suburban parents are
generally satisﬁed with the public schools their children attend, and they want to protect
both the physical and the ﬁnancial sanctity of these schools.”).
171. Garnett, supra note 137, at 26–27.
172. Indeed, even the U.S. Department of State helps facilitate homeschooling and
seeks to exploit the growing array and the use of online content resources for the beneﬁt
of Foreign Service families stationed outside of the United States. Cf. Homeschooling and
Online Education, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/m/dghr/ﬂo/c21941.htm
[http://perma.cc/7CVF-CEDQ] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017) (outlining the Department of
State’s homeschooling programs for Foreign Service families).
173. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 206.10. Number
and Percentage of Homeschooled Students Ages 5 Through 17 with a Grade Equivalent of
Kindergarten Through 12th Grade, by Selected Child, Parent, and Household
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In addition to homeschooling growth trends, another notable wrinkle
in the homeschool context is the evolving composition of households
engaged in homeschooling and its deeper penetration into American
society. Between 2003 and 2012, the percentage of homeschooling parents
possessing a graduate or professional degree increased and the percentage
of parents with no more than a high school diploma decreased.174
Similarly, the median household income of homeschooled children has
increased.175 The broadening of the pool of families engaged in homeschooling has led some to characterize homeschools as “mainstream.”176
B.

Education Spending: The 2007–2008 Financial Crisis and Its Implications
for School Choice

As overall federal education spending includes far more support for
an array of school choice options, trends in federal ﬁnancial support for
K–12 schools warrant careful attention for at least two reasons. First,
while the school-ﬁnance context is one noted for sustained and protracted litigation, principally in state courts,177 the dynamic blend of
education-funding sources is important for its potential federalism implications. To the extent that the federal government contributes a greater
relative and absolute amount of education funding, a correlative increase
in federal policy preferences would plausibly—and logically—follow. A
second, and more subtle, reason involves the interaction among the
various sources of public ﬁnancial support for education and the 2007–
2008 ﬁnancial crisis. This interaction may have contributed to increased
parental demands for school choice, which, as previously discussed,
plausibly reﬂects and implicates a shift in education decisionmaking
authority from governments to families and students.
1. Education Spending. — As Table 1 illustrates, after approximately
1980, the distribution of federal, state, and local revenue sources for
public elementary and secondary schools largely stabilized. A slight
disruption, primarily owing to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008, emerged
in the 2009–2010 school year.

Characteristics: 2003, 2007, and 2012 (2014), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/
tables/dt15_206.10.asp [http://perma.cc/37XE-LWSQ]. To be sure, however, the changes
in these two trends over time are small and fall within the reported standard errors.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Jennifer Karinen, Note, Finding a Free Speech Right to Homeschool: An
Emersonian Approach, 105 Geo. L.J. 191, 194–95 (2016) (noting that homeschooling has
become “much more visible and accepted”).
177. See, e.g., John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Recedes, in
From Schoolhouse to Courthouse: The Judiciary’s Role in American Education 96, 96
(Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2010) (discussing state court litigation over
school ﬁnance).
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TABLE 1: SOURCE OF REVENUE (PERCENTAGE), 1920–2013178
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While the distribution of revenue among federal, state, and local
sources conveys relative stability (post-1980), what Table 1 does not
convey is the dynamic, real overall growth in per-pupil spending in
America’s public elementary and secondary schools over these same
years. Table 2 illustrates that, despite a recent downturn beginning in the
2009–2010 school year, for almost the past century public school perpupil spending in the United States in real dollars displays a marked,
steady increase over time. Interestingly, the combination of Tables 1 and
2 implies that one source of the per-pupil spending drop in 2010 can be
attributed to an absolute and comparative reduction in state education
spending triggered by the ﬁnancial crisis.
As Table 2 illustrates, there has been a nearly unbroken trend of
increased per-pupil spending since 1920, excepting school years
following 2009. The timing of this important break and the financial crisis
cannot, obviously, be ascribed to mere coincidence. Given the broad and
deep ﬁnancial devastation of the crisis, its deleterious implications for
public and private budgets are similarly unsurprising.

178. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 235.10. Revenues
for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by Source of Funds: Selected Years, 1919–20
Through 2012–13 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_235.10.asp
[http://perma.cc/PC3N-SU5U].
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TABLE 2: TOTAL ANNUAL PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURE (IN CONSTANT 2014–
2015 DOLLARS), 1920–2013179
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2. Consequences for School Choice. — Lurking beneath the obvious
consequences of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis are less obvious and more
subtle effects. As the per-pupil spending trend data in Table 2 illustrates,
the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis clearly impacted education spending. As
the data in Table 2 are aggregated across all districts by year, what is not
illustrated is important across-district variation. Variations aside, Professor
Black describes the financial consequences of the “Great Recession” to
public school districts in blunt, dramatic terms.180 Setting aside the
primary fallouts—including often dramatic reductions in raw cash ﬂow to
many school districts—scholars have also noted additional secondary and
tertiary consequences, albeit subtle ones, that may contribute to a further

179. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t Educ., Digest of Education Statistics:
Table 236.55. Total and Current Expenditures per Pupil in Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools: Selected Years, 1919–20 Through 2012–13 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_236.55.asp [http://perma.cc/US7D-9NZ6].
180. See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 423,
424 (2016) (describing the impact as a “crisis” and noting that “[s]ome states experienced
massive cuts for multiple years”).

2017]

EDUCATION FEDERALISM

1891

devolution of education decisionmaking authority from governments to
families and students.181
Along with its impact on public education funding, the 2007–2008
ﬁnancial crisis ﬁnancially devastated many households.182 Given the
ﬁnancial crisis’s magnitude, the collateral damage inevitably included
some children, speciﬁcally moving some children from private schools
back to public schools. Thus, students who previously attended private
schools now found themselves in public schools owing to familial
ﬁnancial exigency. Some of these students and their families undoubtedly brought their preferences for greater school choice with them and
began to push for greater public and publicly funded school choice.
While parental demands for greater control over schooling options for
their children predated the ﬁnancial crisis, an inﬂux of students from
families predisposed toward greater school choice, as demonstrated by
their preference for private school, into public schools will likely steepen
the overall demand curve for greater parental autonomy.
C.

Demand for Public School: A Comparatively Smaller Slice of a Shrinking Pie

An increasing demand for non-public school alternatives has over
time eroded public schools’ market share of students. At the same time,
demographic data convey a relatively static supply of school-age children.
While the raw number of school-aged—deﬁned as ﬁve- to seventeen-yearold—resident Americans between 2000 and 2010 suggests minimal
growth, specifically around 1%, assessing school-aged, resident Americans
as a percentage of the total resident population demonstrates a 1.5%
decline from 18.9% to 17.4% in the same period.183 If one goes back to
the 1969–1970 school year, the drop climbs to around 8%, from 25.8% to
17.4%.184 Thus, the interaction of a demonstrably increasing appetite for
school choice and a static supply of school-age children more accurately
captures the contours of the challenges now confronting public schools
and their potential customers.

181. I appreciate Professor Black for raising this intriguing new, subtle wrinkle with
me. He also brieﬂy notes this possibility in Derek W. Black, The Constitutional
Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at
66–68) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
182. See, e.g., Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis
and Great Recession on American Households 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 16407, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407.pdf [http://perma.cc/J7KN-459Y]
(finding “widespread” effects of the recession on American households); see also Melissa B.
Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 115, 115–16
(2009) (discussing bankruptcy reforms incident to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis).
183. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: Table 101.40.
Estimated Total and School-Age Resident Populations, by State: Selected Years, 1970 Through
2014 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_101.40.asp?current=yes
[http://perma.cc/3DCS-GLKC].
184. Id.
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A comparatively decreasing appetite for traditional, “assigned”
public schools raises important social, political, and economic issues for
public schools and school officials. To the extent that any stigma
previously existed for those families who, for whatever reason, opted out
of their assigned public schools,185 that stigma attaching to families
seeking schooling alternatives has dissipated, as non-assigned-publicschool and non-public-school attendance has increased, both in absolute
and relative terms.
Politically and economically, the stakes are even higher for public
schools. While the politics surrounding school choice policies are
anything but clear, political support for public schools remains
important, indeed critical. Insofar as public school budgets are a
function of a public’s willingness to tax itself, public schools’ ﬁnancial
health depends on popular political support for public schools.186
Families who opt out of public schools altogether likely absorb private
school tuition on top of their property tax contributions, which help
fund local public schools. As a result, their appetite to “invest” in local
public schools likely diminishes, at least at the margins.
To be sure, it remains important to note that property owners retain
an economic incentive to support even those local public schools that
their kids do not attend. After all, in many districts, including many
affluent suburban districts, homeowners pay a premium for property
located in a public school district beneﬁtting from a favorable reputation.187 Given the direct economic relation between perceptions of
public-school-district quality and property values, even property owners
without school-age children or those with children who have opted out of
public schools still have an important economic incentive to help ensure
that positive perceptions of the assigned school district persist.
These constantly evolving political, social, and economic dynamics
help fuel political turbulence surrounding school choice that increasingly
straddles traditional political labels and exhibits complex political

185. See generally Diane Ravitch, Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization
Movement and the Danger to America’s Public Schools (2013) (arguing for an end to the
privatization movement, which drains students and funding from public schools); David
Cutler, The Private-School Stigma, Atlantic (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2015/01/bridging-private-and-public-schools/384673/ [http://perma.cc/
AG7Q-332H] (discussing ways in which the reform community viliﬁes non-public-school
students and teachers).
186. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1, 8 (2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/
164/antitrust-competition-policy-inequality/pdf [http://perma.cc/H7MN-W4HB] (observing
that “it has long been suggested that private schools reduce political support for larger public
school budgets”).
187. See, e.g., William T. Bogart & Brian A. Cromwell, How Much More Is a Good
School District Worth?, 50 Nat’l Tax J. 215, 230–31 (1997) (ﬁnding “high-quality school
districts provide services valued in excess of the higher taxes that they levy”).

2017]

EDUCATION FEDERALISM

1893

dynamics.188 To be sure, Republican administrations have been comparatively more hospitable to the idea of increased competition among
schools, including public schools.189 One recent example is President
Trump’s initial address to a joint session of Congress in January 2017, in
which Trump made clear his Administration’s support for, among other
education reforms, publicly funded voucher programs that expressly
include homeschooling.190 The drive at the federal level for increased
competition among schools is not conﬁned to Republican administrations, however. As Diane Ravitch, a staunch and vocal school choice
critic, notes, the “Obama administration [was] just as enthusiastic about
privately managed charter schools as the Republicans.”191 Consequently,
contributing to the political complexities surrounding school choice is
that traditional, reliable political “markers” increasingly do not provide
much predictive force in the education context.
III. WHAT A FOCUS ON TRADITIONAL EDUCATION FEDERALISM RISKS
MISSING—AND WHY IT MATTERS
An ongoing federalism “tug-of-war” between the federal and state
governments, as well as among the federal branches, over education
policy control shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Indeed, if
anything, the juxtaposition of NCLB and ESSA, along with the controversy surrounding the conﬁrmation of President Trump’s Secretary of
Education, Betsy DeVos, makes quite clear that ﬁghts over education
federalism boundaries are, if anything, heating up. These boundary
ﬁghts, particularly in light of recent political turbulence, will also
continue to attract scholarly and public attention. And, to be sure, the
distribution of education policy authority—both horizontally and vertically—deserves some attention, as who decides can often be as, if not more,
important as what is decided.

188. See, e.g., Ryan & Heise, supra note 9, at 2080–81 (discussing the underappreciated political resistance to voucher programs from many Republicans in affluent
suburbs despite Republican leaders’ support for vouchers).
189. For example, past Republican administrations have pressed for publicly funded
voucher programs that include private religious schools. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Senate
Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. Times (Jun. 13, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/13/us/senate-rejects-tuition-aid-a-key-to-bush-educationplan.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James
E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 350–51
(2001) (noting the Reagan and Bush Administrations’ general support for greater school
choice, including public funding for parents who want to send their children to religious
schools).
190. See Yamiche Alcindor, Trump’s Call for School Vouchers Is a Return to a
Campaign Pledge, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/01/
us/politics/trump-school-vouchers-campaign-pledge.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
191. Ravitch, Private, supra note 136, at 58.
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An undue focus on formal education federalism boundary disputes
and the allocation and reallocation of policy control between federal and
state governments, however, risks missing an equally and, potentially,
more profound important structural shift in power. School choice, in all
its various forms exercised by parents and students, continues to increase
in both absolute and relative terms. One inevitable consequence of
school choice policies is that they reduce governmental control over the
education enterprise in a fundamental manner. An increase in school
choice results in an unmistakable shift in power over critical educational
decisions concerning elementary and secondary schooling away from
government (at all levels) and toward parents and their schoolchildren.
While reasonable people of good will can and do differ over the policy
implications and wisdom of such a shift in authority, as a descriptive
matter, evidence of this shift appears quite clear. Moreover, even school
choice critics understand and acknowledge that parents have a legal
authority to exercise their rights in ways that public school districts
cannot.192 The resulting shift in control over school assignments from
governments to parents possesses quite important implications for
education federalism, albeit in an indirect manner. While control over
education policy—particularly public education policy—can dramatically
inﬂuence schools, as more parents gain control over where their kids go
to schools, jurisdictional squabbles among governmental units over what
happens within schools will decline in importance.
Given the explosive market developments, homeschooling, with its
potential to disrupt traditional education markets and further contribute
to the diminished relevance of current education federalism turbulence,
warrants particular attention. While it is difficult to accurately assess how
the dramatic growth of quality online curricula and resources will
continue to inform homeschooling’s popularity over time, a few points
are already clear. First, at its core, education remains a labor-intensive
activity, whether delivered in traditional schools or in the home. On this
point, status quo largely endures, and homeschooling remains limited
only to those who can absorb (or organize) and meet the intensive labor
requirements. While technology, including online instruction, can
reduce this burden, technology cannot—at least not yet—substantially
eliminate the ﬁxed labor requirements. Technological developments can
reduce, however, other traditional market barriers, including, for
example, access to instructional material.193 The potentially signiﬁcant
reduction of one traditional barrier to the homeschooling market will
likely steepen homeschooling’s growth trend going forward.
192. See, e.g., Julie F. Mead & Maria M. Lewis, The Implications of the Use of Parental
Choice as a Legal “Circuit Breaker,” 53 Am. Educ. Res. J. 100, 100–01 (2016) (highlighting
parental choice as a means of evading legal limitations on public actors and governmental
authorities).
193. To reference just one obvious example: Access to the Internet now makes available
a growing plethora of high-quality learning material.
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To argue, as this Essay does, that increased school choice will
diminish the comparative importance of education federalism squabbles
is not to argue that education federalism will become unimportant.
Obviously, and for good reasons, federalism boundaries matter, as they
should, and they will continue to matter in the education context and
elsewhere. On the horizontal axis, important questions about whether
education policy is or should be primarily an executive or legislative
function will persist. President Trump’s recent decision to formally withdraw
a “Dear Colleague” letter concerning transgender school-bathroom
access is one recent example of this ongoing structural separation of
power tension and one that has already yielded palpable legal and policy
consequences.194 To the extent that both branches will continue to participate, ﬁghts over policy control between Congress and the Executive
Branch will not go away, particularly when political control over Congress
and the presidency is divided between Republicans and Democrats.
Similarly, as the quick transition from NCLB to ESSA amply
illustrates, analogous fights over education policy will endure between the
federal and state governments (and, in a similar manner, between state
governments and local school districts). The evolving composition of
school budgets from federal, state, and local sources contributes to and,
indeed, exacerbates vertical separation of power tensions.195
CONCLUSION
Acknowledging that education federalism concerns will likely—and
appropriately—endure, however, does not diminish this Essay’s central
point: that a focus on education federalism and its related squabbles risks
missing a critical shift in education control occasioned by increased
demand and capacity for school choice, broadly deﬁned. School choice
shifts fundamental power from governments at all levels to parents and
their schoolchildren. Such a move restructures the balance of power
between governments and citizens with respect to school attendance and
materially disrupts a status quo that structurally favors public school
attendance.
Given the importance of education to an individual’s ability to
participate fully in the nation’s economic, political, and social realms,
that states compel some amount of education is unremarkable.196 Equally
unremarkable, however, is that our constitutional values, expressed by
the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, allow individuals the ability to
194. See supra section I.B.1.
195. See supra Table 1.
196. For a tabular summary of state compulsory education laws as of 2015, see Nat’l
Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, State Readiness and Progress Through School: Table 5.1.
Compulsory School Attendance Laws, Minimum and Maximum Age Limits for Required
Free Education, by State: 2015, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_1.asp
[http://perma.cc/4NWX-GVE7] (last visited Aug. 7, 2017).
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discharge their affirmative schooling obligations through public- and
non-public-school attendance.197 The distribution of families able to fully
exercise their Pierce rights, however, predictably skews in a direction that
favors the wealthy over the poor.198 To the extent that school choice
policies increase education autonomy for a greater number and percentage of families, a corresponding shift in power from governments to
families will result.

197. 268 U.S. 510, 534–45 (1925) (holding that a statute may not constitutionally
require that children receive their mandatory schooling from only public schooling).
198. Another variant of families exercising their “Pierce rights” is when those families
with the economic ability to do so select to live in districts with high-performing public
schools. Not surprisingly, such districts typically correlate with comparatively higher property values. See Bogart & Cromwell, supra note 187, at 231.

